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Capital’s Geodesic: Chicago, New Jersey, and the Material 
Sociology of Speed 
Donald MacKenzie 
  
The development of the technologies for transmitting financial data is a clear 
demonstration of the central thesis of Wajcman’s Pressed for Time.1  ‘Temporal 
demands are not inherent to technology’, she argues.  ‘They are built into our 
devices by all-too-human schemes and desires’ (Wajcman 2015, p.3). This 
chapter examines one of the most dramatic increases in speed in recent times: 
the shift from trading conducted among human beings at a pace they could 
follow, to high-frequency trading or HFT (the fast, entirely automated trading of 
large numbers of shares and other financial instruments), which involves 
speeds beyond those perceptible by human beings. To be sure, this shift has 
been made possible by wider developments over the past three decades in 
computing and communication technologies, but the speed-up of trading cannot 
fully be explained simply by generic technological change. As Wajcman would 
suggest, it also results from design decisions that are quite specific, and that 
reflected priorities that are different from those of the wider information and 
communication industries.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  second	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  draws	  upon	  MacKenzie	  (2014);	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  the	  London	  
Review	  of	  Books	  for	  permission	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  research	  reported	  here	  is	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  project	  
(Evaluation	  Practices	  in	  Financial	  Markets)	  supported	  financially	  by	  the	  European	  Research	  
Council	  (grant	  agreement	  no.	  291733).	  Figure	  1	  was	  kindly	  produced	  by	  Taylor	  Spears,	  using	  
the	  open-­‐source	  application	  KDE	  Marble.	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The chapter draws upon one strand of research I have been conducting 
over the past five years on HFT, on the streams of data and technologies drawn 
on in it, and on the development of the electronic trading venues on which HFT 
is practised. The research is primarily interview-based and, so far, largely US-
focused (of the 172 interviews conducted so far, 61 have been in New York and 
61 in Chicago); see Table 1 for more details, and for the two-letter acronyms 
used to label interviewees. (One interviewee, Stéphane Tyč of McKay Brothers, 
has given me his permission to name him.) The overall goal of the research is 
to discover how automated trading and electronic venues in which it takes place 
have been and are being shaped in five main markets: shares, futures, foreign 
exchange, US Treasury bonds, and options. 
 – INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE –  
The theoretical premise of the research is that, in order to understand 
financial markets, we need a material sociology of those markets, one that 
gives equal weight to each of those two words. I’ve explored the underlying 
theoretical position at length elsewhere (MacKenzie 2009), but let me 
summarize briefly by expressing the key point in actor-network theory terms, 
since that theory (for which see, e.g. Latour 1987 and 2005 and Callon 1986) is 
currently the most influential form taken by material sociology. The actors in 
financial markets are almost never ‘naked’ individual human beings. Rather, 
they are assemblages of human beings (often multiple human beings) and 
technical artefacts: both ‘physical’ artefacts ― such as computers, calculators, 
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and communications technologies ― and ‘cognitive’ artefacts such as 
mathematical models.2 
  
That has always been the case, even if artefacts of the past, both 
physical and cognitive, look primitive to today’s eyes. A basic postulate of the 
material sociology of financial markets is that artefacts matter: that different 
configurations of humans and physical/cognitive equipment form different 
actors and have different effects. That, for example, is a generalization of what 
has become the well known thesis of the ‘performativity of economics’: the idea 
that economics (understood in a broad sense, not simply as the academic 
discipline) is not just an external representation of markets but intervenes 
actively in markets, indeed is part of how markets are constructed (Callon 1998; 
MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 2007). 
  
It is clear that, in high-frequency trading, action flows directly from 
artefacts (orders to buy or sell are placed by computer systems with no direct 
human involvement) and indirectly from assemblages of human beings and 
artefacts. The firms are typically small: a staffing complement of a hundred 
people makes you quite a large HFT firm, possibly among the two dozen 
largest worldwide. (A big organization such as a bank often has an old-
established, slow technical infrastructure, and banks are structured 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The	  distinction	  between	  the	  ‘physical’	  and	  the	  ‘cognitive’	  is	  for	  ease	  of	  exposition	  only.	  The	  
brain	  is	  a	  material	  organ,	  and	  has	  limited	  processing	  and	  memory	  capacity.	  In	  consequence,	  as	  
the	  literature	  on	  ‘extended’	  or	  ‘distributed’	  cognition	  (e.g.	  Hutchins	  1995)	  emphasizes,	  many	  
cognitive	  operations	  involve	  external	  equipment.	  For	  example,	  many	  of	  today’s	  mathematical	  
models	  in	  finance	  cannot	  realistically	  be	  solved	  by	  an	  unaided	  human	  being:	  they	  have	  to	  run	  
on	  computer	  systems.	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bureaucratically, frequently with an IT department separate from trading teams; 
the combination of slow infrastructure and organizational separation makes the 
flexible, responsive development of fast systems hard.) The vast majority of an 
HFT firm’s trading is initiated by its computer systems. The direct role of human 
beings is often restricted to monitoring the operation of trading systems and 
closing them down if things go wrong, for example if trading algorithms start 
incurring losses and for some reason do not shut themselves off. Less directly, 
though, humans do of course write the algorithms, and it is quite common for 
human beings to be allowed to select which algorithms to employ. In some 
‘grey box’ systems (as participants call them) the human user can also choose 
the values of one or more mathematical parameters of an algorithm.   
 
HFT hasn’t generally speeded up the pace of human work.  One 
consequence of the often limited direct role of human beings in HFT is that they 
can experience less pervasive time pressure than in older forms of trading in 
which humans were more central. A trading room from an earlier generation 
was often a busy, noisy place.  Information flowed into it not just from computer 
screens but also via telephone calls, conversations and shouted interjections.  
‘Hoot-n-holler’ or ‘squawk box’ systems ‒ involving permanently open telephone 
connections among multiple traders and brokers ‒ brought near-constant 
interruptions when markets were busy, and reacting to customer demands or 
market developments involved quick use of a keyboard or a succession of rapid 
telephone conversations. In contrast, the trading rooms of HFT firms are usually 
quiet ― in my visits to them, I’ve never heard anyone shouting; phones almost 
never seem to ring ― and while some traders can be seen focused intensely on 
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computer screens, others have time to chat. The typical atmosphere of such 
rooms resembles that of a high-technology start-up company more than that of 
a traditional trading floor.  With machines doing the direct trading, human 
traders can in many cases simply keep a loose eye on them while also (as 
interviewee AV put it) working on ‘long-term projects’: researching and 
developing new trading algorithms. 
  
Rather, the speed-up is of HFT as a material, technological practice. 
What follows focuses on one very specific aspect of that material practice: the 
communications links between the Chicago futures markets and the computer 
datacentres in New Jersey in which shares – and also Treasury bonds, foreign 
exchange and stock options – are traded. (If space permitted, a broadly similar 
account could be given of other crucial links, for example those that 
interconnect the New Jersey datacentres or the transatlantic submarine 
cables.) The next two sections of the chapter explore the changing material 
forms of those links and how, as Wajcman might suggest, those forms have 
been and are being deliberately shaped for speed. There are trade-offs in the 
design of any technical system – interviewee SO, a specialist in 
telecommunications links for finance, quoted an engineer’s saying: ‘you can 
make it fast, cheap or reliable, pick two’ – and the trade-offs made in the design 
of the Chicago-New Jersey links discussed in this chapter quite consciously 
prioritized speed. The chapter’s final section then emphasizes that, though 
those links are shaped intimately by the physical world and our knowledge of it, 
they are not ‘mere physicality’: they are also social in at least four different 
senses. 
6	  
	  
 
Transmitting Prices from Chicago to New Jersey by Fibre-Optic 
Cable 
It’s very tempting to theorize globalization as involving time speeding up and 
space shrinking (see, especially Harvey 1989). In respect to trading, however, 
that formulation is only half right, as is pointed out in MacKenzie, Beunza, Millo, 
and Pardo-Guerra (2012): precisely because the material activity of automated 
trading has speeded up dramatically, so geography and spatial distance ― 
where exactly places are, and the shortest route between them ― have taken 
on a new significance. The shortest, and therefore the fastest, route on the 
surface of the earth between any two places is what’s called the ‘geodesic’ or 
great-circle route. The world’s financially most crucial geodesic ― the spinal 
cord of U.S. capitalism ― runs from Aurora, a town in Illinois that’s now an 
outer suburb of Chicago, to northern New Jersey.  
– INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE – 
Aurora matters to global finance because in 2012 the CME, the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, relocated its electronic trading system to a new data 
centre there. (Earlier, its trading system and thus the start of the crucial 
geodesic was in a data centre called Cermak, just south of the Chicago Loop.) 
The CME trades futures: at first, futures on eggs, onions and other agricultural 
commodities, but since 1972 financial futures as well. Originally, Chicago 
futures trading was done face-to-face (by voice, or eye-contact and hand 
signal) in raucous, crowded trading pits. The CME’s pit traders fiercely resisted 
the coming of electronic trading: its leading advocate, Leo Melamed, received 
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frequent death threats.  By 2004, however, that resistance had crumbled, and 
now nearly all the CME’s trading is electronic.  (For discussion of the processes 
of change, see MacKenzie 2015.) 
  
The CME’s first fully electronic product was the E-Mini financial future, 
launched in 1997. It tracks the S&P 500 index, made up of the 500 leading U.S. 
stocks. The buyer and the seller of an E-Mini each maintain a deposit known as 
‘margin’ on account at the CME’s clearing house. Every night, the clearing 
house adjusts those deposits. If the S&P 500 index has risen by a single point, 
$50 is transferred from the seller’s account to the buyer’s; if it has fallen by ten 
points, say, $500 shifts from the buyer to the seller. If their deal is for a 
thousand E-Minis, the latter sum becomes $500,000. (The contract is called the 
‘Mini’ or the ‘little’ because these transfers were five times larger for the contract 
that traders called the ‘big’, the corresponding pit-traded S&P 500 future.) 
  
Both the literature of financial economics (e.g., Budish, Cramton, and 
Shim 2013) and traders themselves in interview report that new information 
relevant to the overall value of U.S. shares tends to show up first in orders for 
and in the prices of the E-Mini, and only a fraction of a second later in the 
underlying shares.3 The likely reason is that the E-Mini gives greater ‘leverage’: 
a modest ‘margin’ deposit permits gains (and, of course, also losses) 
corresponding to buying or selling a large and expensive block of shares. So if 
traders think that they or their automated trading systems have an information 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  There	  is	  some	  suggestion	  in	  one	  of	  my	  more	  recent	  interviews	  (BU,	  interviewed	  in	  June	  2015)	  
that	  this	  pattern	  may	  be	  being	  replaced	  by	  more	  of	  a	  two-­‐way	  interaction.	  
8	  
	  
edge, it has traditionally been to the E-Mini that they will usually turn first. For 
example, the big crises of modern US stock markets have tended to show up 
first in the E-Mini (or, before 1997, in its predecessor, the S&P 500 pit-traded 
future) and only a little later in the stock market. 
  
Changes in the electronic order book for the E-Mini are crucial 
information for automated share trading (this particular game is now too fast for 
human players, who wouldn’t be able to react quickly enough to those 
changes). Suppose the price of the E-Mini has fallen, or even simply that the 
number of offers (sell orders) has risen sharply and the number of bids (buy 
orders) has fallen. Over the next fraction of a second, falls in the prices of the 
underlying shares are more likely than increases. 
 
 The fact that changes in Chicago’s futures order books and prices are 
closely linked to, and generally precede, changes in share prices makes the 
transmission of futures data to the datacentres in which shares are traded a 
crucial matter. Originally mainly in New York, those datacentres are now in New 
Jersey, where real estate is cheaper. For more than a decade, there have been 
concerted efforts to speed transmission from Chicago to New Jersey. By the 
time the E-Mini was launched in 1997, state-of-the-art transmission was via 
fibre-optic cable. That is intrinsically very fast: light signals in optical fibre travel 
at around two-thirds of what the theory of relativity posits as the fastest possible 
speed, that of light in a vacuum. For nearly all human purposes, therefore, the 
existing network of fibre-optic cables was fast enough, and the telecoms firms 
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that had created that network had not been concerned with achieving further 
increments in speed. Rather, they chose paths (such as alongside railway lines) 
along which it was easy to negotiate permission to lay their cables, and shaped 
their networks so that they served the maximum number of large population 
centres. As will be discussed below, they also prioritized ease of repair over 
minimum cable length. 
 
 By the early 2000s, however, HFT firms were beginning to focus on the 
fastest possible transmission from Chicago to the East Coast datacentres in 
which shares are traded. To begin with, it was difficult for them to get the 
telecoms companies even to understand their resultant concern with matters 
such as specific cable routes. They couldn’t go to a company such as Verizon 
and ask for the fastest route:  
you could go to your Verizon salesperson, and they had no such product 
in their catalogue. They just sold circuits. The Verizon provisioning 
systems … didn’t have the capacity to actually understand shortest path. 
They just knew you wanted a T-1 or a T-3 [or] whatever between point A 
and B, and they would provision on whatever [cables] happened to be 
available. And by the way, they would reprovision it [shift to different 
cables] if they needed to do some load balancing … they never actually 
thought that anybody cared [about the exact physical route]. (Interviewee 
SO)4 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  T-­‐1	  (Transmission	  System	  1)	  was	  the	  original	  1962	  AT&T	  digital-­‐transmission	  specification,	  
which	  was	  later	  re-­‐implemented	  for	  optical	  fibre.	  T-­‐2	  and	  T-­‐3	  are	  higher-­‐capacity	  versions.	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There were, nevertheless, databases of fibre-optic cable routes, 
including one constructed by CFN, a specialist network firm based just outside 
of Washington, DC. Using CFN’s database, along with trial-and-error testing, a 
Chicago HFT firm discovered, in the early 2000s, an old cable laid several 
years earlier between Chicago and the East Coast by the pioneering Internet 
service provider UUNET.5 From a standard telecommunications viewpoint, the 
cable was unimpressive. Its bandwidth (capacity) was limited, and to save 
money, UUNET had simply buried the cable in the soil, rather than laying it in 
conduits as was normal practice. However, UUNET had also sought to cut 
costs by choosing as short a route as reasonably feasible, largely following 
power lines across the countryside. That meant that the inferior, old cable was 
actually the fastest route between Chicago and New York/New Jersey. 
Eventually, the HFT firm succeeded in persuading the cable’s then owner to 
lease it to the firm, and the resultant capacity of the firm’s East Coast computer 
systems to receive Chicago prices faster than other systems helped it become 
a dominant player in share trading. 
  
The next stage in the technological evolution of Chicago-New Jersey 
communications is the best documented (Steiner 2010; MacKenzie, Beunza, 
Millo, and Pardo-Guerra 2012; Lewis 2014). It began with trader Dan Spivey’s 
realization that existing routes were not the fastest possible (even the UUNET 
cable was still at some distance from the geodesic), and that a new cable closer 
to the geodesic was a commercially attractive proposition: any HFT firm whose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  My	  main	  source	  here,	  interviewee	  SO,	  said	  that	  ‘couple’	  of	  firms	  discovered	  this	  cable,	  but	  
other	  sources	  (interviewees	  AF	  and	  BQ)	  indicate	  that	  one	  particular	  firm	  gained	  control	  of	  this	  
route.	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algorithms depended on the fast transmission of prices between Chicago and 
the East Coast would have to use it, and would therefore be prepared to pay 
high fees to do so. With funding from the venture capitalist James Barksdale, 
Spivey’s firm, Spread Networks, negotiated with dozens of local governments 
and landowners the rights to lay a new, more direct cable. Closeness to the 
geodesic brought physical difficulties – the Allegheny Mountains lay in the way 
(although interviewee SO reports that the extent of drilling through rock is 
implicitly exaggerated in existing accounts) – but Spread Networks overcame 
those difficulties, and also succeeded in keeping the project secret until shortly 
before its completion. The firm spent at least $300 million (one interviewee 
suggested it may have been as much as $500 million) laying the new cable, but 
its bet that HFTs would have no alternative but to pay large sums to lease 
strands of fibre in the cable from Spread turned out to be correct: former high-
frequency trader Peter Kovac (2014, p.3) reports that the fee was $176,000 per 
month, with a requirement to enter into leases several years long. 
 
The new cable, which began to operate in August 2010, runs from 
Aurora through Chicago to Cermak, then along the south shore of Lake 
Michigan, across rural Indiana and Ohio, along the south shore of Lake Erie, 
and then across rural Pennsylvania to Carteret, New Jersey	  (the site of 
Nasdaq’s datacentre), before finally turning north to 165 Halsey Street (the 
datacentre in Newark that is New Jersey’s main telecoms hub) and then the 
other New Jersey financial datacentres and Manhattan. This close-to-geodesic 
routing became its most celebrated feature. However, the prioritization of speed 
had other manifestations not discussed in the existing literature on the cable. 
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First, when laying a normal telecommunications cable (see, for example, Figure 
2), standard practice was and is for construction crews to add considerable 
slack (typically 5-10 percent of a cable’s total length):  
[W]hen you run fibre you put slack in … you take the cable and you just 
coil it up at each of [the amplifier] centres or … in manholes, and the 
reason you do that is because every once in a while the fibre gets cut. 
Someone is doing construction, a train derails, a bridge abutment erodes, 
whatever, and the cable breaks … What you want is a cable that’s a little 
loose and you can pull the two ends together, splice them together, and 
you’re good to go. (Interviewee SO) 
Spread Networks deliberately used much less slack:  
[A]t Spread there was a constant fight with the construction crews 
because they wanted to do what they’ve always done: ‘Why wouldn’t you 
want slack in the network?’ They didn’t understand latency considerations: 
‘Why do you care about a few microseconds [millionths of a second]?’ 
(Interviewee SO) 
 – FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE – 
Second, when optical fibre is used to transmit signals over large 
distances, those signals need amplified at intermediate points. As the Spread 
Networks cable runs across Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, there are eleven 
such points, which take the form of concrete bunkers. An HFT firm that leases a 
fibre in the cable needs to run that fibre through an amplifier in each of the 
bunkers. A telecommunications firm would place a general-purpose switch in 
each bunker so as to facilitate network interconnections, for example to nearby 
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towns. Those switches, however, slow transmission, so the HFT firms using the 
Spread cable ‘would basically go just either straight optical-to-optical 
[amplification] or a very simple, lean electrical-to-optical and straight back, not 
going through a general switching fabric’ (interviewee SO).  
 
 Third, modern fibre-optic transmission employs ‘dense wave division 
multiplexing’, in which there are multiple channels of communication on a single 
fibre, which are kept from interfering with each other by the fact that a different 
wavelength of light is used for each. A telecommunications firm will want to 
maximize the bandwidth (capacity) of the fibre, so might use as many as a 
hundred different channels with different wavelengths. The firm will accept the 
fact that this dense packing causes a small amount of interference to take 
place, and to compensate for that will employ software that processes the 
messages being transmitted, adding extra binary digits to them that enable 
errors in transmission to be detected and corrected. This ‘forward error 
correction’, as it is called, slows transmission, so HFT firms generally do not 
employ it. Instead, they pack many fewer communications channels (perhaps 
as few as ten) into a single fibre of the Spread cable. 
 
 Speed, however, was not the only imperative that imposed itself on the 
Spread cable: the other (perhaps surprisingly) was perceived fairness. It would 
have been hard to recruit subscribers if they had feared that other subscribers 
would still be able to have a speed advantage. So Spread devoted considerable 
effort to ensuring that this would not happen to a subscriber who paid for 
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premium access.6 The most important issue in this respect was paying close 
attention to the paths followed by different strands of fibre in each of the eleven 
bunkers, so as to ensure those paths were of equal lengths. Each bunker was 
only around 15 metres long, but as interviewee SO put it, ‘the reality is you’re 
going up, down, and across, and so on. And if you do that eleven times it starts 
to add up’. (The focus on this issue indicates the sensitivity of speed. Even 
‘adding up’, any path difference was likely to be only a small number of metres 
at most, and a signal moving at two-thirds of the speed of light in a vacuum 
travels 200,000 kilometres – 200 million metres – in a second.) So important 
was fairness that even the slight physical inhomogeneity of the material making 
up the different strands of fibre was compensated for, with the strands that had 
marginally lower refractive indexes made ever so slightly longer (by a small 
amount of coiling if necessary) to ensure transmission times that were as equal 
as possible. 
 
When Two-Thirds of the Speed of Light is Not Enough: The Shift to 
Microwave 
What Spread Networks could do little about, however, was the basic physical 
effect that slows the transmission of light in optical fibre. Spread used 
TrueWave® RS fibre, which was the fibre with the lowest refractive index (and 
thus the highest transmission speed) that could be employed without increasing 
the number of bunkers. Its refractive index, however, is around 1.47 (Lucent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  There	  was	  a	  second	  tier	  of	  subscribers	  who	  paid	  lower	  fees,	  but	  experienced	  a	  transmission	  
time	  around	  a	  millisecond	  slower	  than	  the	  premium:	  ‘there	  was	  literally	  a	  cabinet	  that	  the	  
fibre	  just	  went	  around	  and	  around	  and	  around	  until	  it	  added	  a	  millisecond	  in	  …	  delay’	  
(interviewee	  SO).	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Technologies 1998; the exact value depends on the wavelength being used), 
which means that light travels in it at just over two-thirds of its speed in a 
vacuum: see Table 2.  
 – INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE –  
There was a much older form of data transmission that did not have this 
drawback: radio transmission through the atmosphere, especially using 
microwaves transmitted along a series of towers (see Figure 3). The refractive 
index of the atmosphere varies with air pressure and temperature, but close to 
the earth’s surface it is typically around 1.0003, meaning that wireless signals 
travel at around 99.97 percent of the speed of light in a vacuum. That physical 
fact was well known (for example to those who designed the Spread cable), but 
they also knew that because of the curvature of the earth, multiple towers with 
microwave repeater equipment were needed. This equipment introduced delays 
that – although imperceptible to human senses and of no consequence in the 
normal uses of microwaves in telecommunications – more than used up any 
speed advantage that microwave might have over the new cable. 
 – FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE – 
At least three people, however, realized that delays in repeater 
equipment might simply be the result of its designers not focusing on speed. 
One was a Soviet-educated computer scientist, Alex Pilosov, who had 
emigrated to the United States, did consultancy work for various Wall Street 
banks, and had set up a business as a high-speed internet provider; the others 
were Robert Meade and Stéphane Tyč, both physicists who had done 
extensive work in finance. Their enquiries to manufacturers about how fast their 
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repeater systems were met with first incomprehension – ‘they would not 
understand the question’ – and then inability to answer: ‘the radio 
manufacturers did not even know how fast they [the repeater systems] were’ 
(Tyč interview).  
 
Pilosov found a small Czech company whose repeater equipment was 
fast by the standards of the day; as with the UUNET cable, its speed was an 
accidental by-product, in this case of the simplicity of its design. He paid the 
company to change its equipment to increase the speed further, and raised 
funds (by selling his house, borrowing as much as he could, and finding an HFT 
firm to back him) to construct a microwave link from Chicago to New Jersey. 
There was a plethora of existing microwave towers that could be used, but 
considerable work (largely done by Pilosov himself) was needed designing the 
network: researching feasible routes; checking that interference with other 
signals would not be a barrier to approval from the Federal Communications 
Commission; doing the structural calculations to show that the towers were 
strong enough to support the new microwave dishes; and persuading 
municipalities to give their permission to install them. By 2010, however, 
Pilosov had his new link up and running.  
 
Meade and Tyč had met as physics PhD students at Harvard University, 
and the two closely linked firms they set up, McKay Brothers and Quincy Data, 
were named after Harvard’s Gordon McKay Applied Science Laboratory and 
Quincy House. They were better resourced than Pilosov, and worked more 
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slowly: they were aware that their new link would face eventual competition, 
and focused on designing it in such a way that it would be very hard for a 
competitor to be as fast or faster. To do so, they had to break with existing 
traditions of microwave network design, which had placed great emphasis on 
reliability and virtually none on speed:  
[W]e realized … that networks did not have to be designed in the ‘old and 
conservative way’. Microwave engineers had applied recipes which 
worked perfectly but which imposed constraints that we relaxed. This 
relaxing of engineering constraints allowed [us] to focus on the most 
important constraint for us which was the total path length. We ruthlessly 
optimized this parameter to create a long lasting network. (Email from Tyč, 
1 October 2014) 
Meade and Tyč placed some of their repeater stations much further apart than 
had been previous practice. Doing this minimized the number of stations and 
thus the delays they caused, but it was also necessary because a route close to 
the geodesic involved a lengthy crossing of Lake Erie (and in the case of 
signals from Cermak, also Lake Michigan): see Figure 1. Their longest ‘hop’ – 
gap between towers – was around 110 km. ‘Most microwave engineers will tell 
you that this is crazy stupid,’ says Tyč, because those engineers believed that 
transmission would become unreliable or even infeasible over that distance 
(Tyč remembers one engineer even ‘saying that microwave links over 50 km 
were not possible’). Meade and Tyč’s understanding of the physics of 
microwave transmission, however, made them confident that their long lake-
crossings were feasible. 
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 The pursuit of speed required more than simply long hops. The US 
Federal Communications Commission makes a number of wavelengths 
available for microwave networks, including 6 GHz (gigahertz), 11 GHz, 18 
GHz, and 23 GHz. From the viewpoint of the reliability of a microwave link, 6 
GHz is best: as frequency increases, links become more vulnerable to 
disruption by rain. If, however, McKay Brothers had restricted themselves to 6 
GHz they would have had to depart from the geodesic: part of the process of 
getting the Federal Communications Commission’s permission to create a new 
microwave link is an analysis of whether it is likely to interfere with existing 
links, and there were simply too many existing 6 GHz links close to the 
geodesic. So Meade and Tyč’s firm used not just 6 GHz but also some 11, 18, 
and even 23 GHz frequencies to keep their route as close as possible to the 
geodesic, even though they knew it increased the likelihood of disruption by 
rain. ‘[W]e had a little motif: better be first 99 percent of the time than second 
100 percent of the time’ (Tyč interview).  
 
 The new McKay Brothers link, completed in 2012 but reworked almost 
continuously since then, has indeed remained in general the fastest (the HFT 
firm that had gained control of the UUNET cable built its own microwave link 
from Chicago to New Jersey, and it briefly surpassed McKay Brothers in speed 
in late 2014). The McKay Brothers’ link also achieved, and indeed soon 
considerably surpassed, the firm’s goal of 99 percent availability. Nevertheless, 
it (and the other microwave links between Chicago and New Jersey, including 
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that created by Pilosov) still remain to some extent vulnerable to the physical 
world: to rain, to gales – which can blow microwave dishes out of alignment and 
make it unsafe for workers to climb the towers to realign them – and even to 
lightning (interviewee SL reported that his firm’s equipment on one tower was 
‘fried’ by a lightning strike because thieves had stolen the copper grounding 
wire). Even the benign summer sunrise and sunset over the Great Lakes can 
be a problem for some networks: it can heat the upper atmosphere more than 
the lower, changing refractive indexes in a way that causes microwaves to 
‘bend up’, and ‘then line-of-sight is shorter than expected’, which can cause a 
link temporarily to fail (email from interviewee SL, relayed by my colleague 
Alexandre Laumonnier). 
 
The Material and the Social 
As Tyč put it, in what turned out to be the first of three interviews with him: ‘in 
the end, all [trading] firms will need to have some kind of microwave service. 
Otherwise they’ll base their decisions on stale data. It’s as simple as that, really. 
It’s physics.’ As the previous two sections of this chapter have shown, the 
physics of data transmission along capital’s geodesic is indeed important. 
Meade and Tyč’s background as physicists also helped give them the 
confidence to depart from standard practices in microwave engineering. But 
what is at stake is not simply physics.  
  
 First, physical processes are intertwined with economic ones. Laughlin, 
Aguirre, and Grundfest (2012) show that the two most consequential changes 
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in transmission technologies from Chicago to New Jersey – the opening of the 
Spread Networks’ cable in April 2010 and of the McKay Brothers’ microwave 
link in August 2012 – had effects that can be traced in the movements of US 
share prices. As Laughlin and his co-authors put it, ‘an appreciable fraction of 
the entire U.S. equities market responds … to just a few bits of information 
emanating from suburban Chicago and travelling via various channels and 
between 4-10 milliseconds, to suburban New Jersey’ – and the speed with 
which it does so increased as state-of-the-art transmission times have fallen as 
sketched in Table 2. That is an effect of ‘the technological’ on ‘the economic’, 
but traders’ anticipation of that effect was of course what led to the economic 
investments that created the Spread cable and the various microwave links. 
  
One of Tyč’s firm’s clients told him ‘that there is a new saying’ in the 
markets: ‘when it rains, the spreads are higher in New Jersey’, in other words 
automated trading systems in the share-trading datacentres in New Jersey post 
less aggressive prices (bid and offers that are not as close to each other) when 
the microwave links from Chicago – and perhaps also the millimetre wave links 
among the New Jersey data centres, which because of the high frequencies 
they use are especially vulnerable to rain (MacKenzie 2014) – are disrupted. Of 
course, that is simply an anecdotal observation, not an econometric finding, but 
the fact that it is said, and is plausible, demonstrates the interweaving. Just as 
the pursuit of speed has given spatial location renewed importance, so it has 
created a link between financial markets and weather whose existence in the 
twenty-first century is striking. 
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 Second, as I have emphasized, the pursuit of speed of transmission of 
price data from Chicago to New Jersey has involved conscious trade-offs (for 
example between speed and reliability, and speed and ease of maintenance), 
resulting in design decisions that were different from those typical of the wider 
communications industry. The resultant fibre-optic and microwave links along 
capital’s geodesic are thus ‘socially shaped’, to use an old expression from the 
sociology of technology (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985): their design, and the 
priorities manifest in it, bear the imprint of the circumstances of their creation.  
  
 Third, the circumstances that have led to these substantial technological 
enterprises are an example of what (Krippner 2001, p. 785) calls ‘congealed … 
struggle’. The details of that struggle cannot be treated here (they will be 
discussed in MacKenzie forthcoming), but its core was the long-standing desire 
of Chicago’s futures markets to trade stock-index futures. For decades, that 
desire had been blocked by the fact that, because an index is a mathematical 
abstraction, it is extremely clumsy to settle a futures trade on an index by 
anything other than a cash payment from the buyer to the seller (or vice versa). 
US law, and indeed the law of many countries, considered a futures contract 
that can be settled only in cash as a wager, and therefore illegal under the law 
of Illinois and indeed of most states of the US. Circumventing this obstacle was 
a tortuous and conflictual process that involved the creation of a new Federal 
regulatory body, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), via legal 
amendments in 1974 to the Commodity Exchange Act. The latter is a Federal 
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act that pre-empts state law, and there is no Federal ban on gambling, which 
made activities within the domain of the new regulator (including trading cash-
settled stock-index futures) legally permissible.  
 
 Hence capital’s geodesic. Because US futures trading has been 
dominated since the nineteenth century by Chicago, the geodesic begins there. 
As noted above, US shares were and are traded almost exclusively on the East 
Coast; hence the geodesic’s end-point. It is also important that this share 
trading falls within the jurisdiction of a different, and often a rival, Federal 
regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission. (The SEC and CFTC 
fought repeated ‘turf wars’ – some even ending up in the courts – concerning 
jurisdiction over products such as stock-index futures that straddled their 
domains.) It may seem odd that two intimately interlinked sets of financial 
instruments (stock-index futures and stocks) should have separate, sometimes 
rival regulators, but the division between the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and Commodity Futures Trading Commission is deeply 
entrenched, and reinforced by the geographic separation: if it were proposed to 
roll the CFTC into the much larger SEC, fierce resistance could be expected 
from Illinois’s Congressional delegation. It also matters that the SEC reports to 
the Senate Banking Committee, while the CFTC reports to the Senate 
Agriculture Committee (the origins of US futures trading lie in agricultural 
products), giving the two regulators separate political power bases. 
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The fact that futures trading and share trading fall under different 
regulatory regimes permits the former’s leverage advantage (referred to above), 
which is what has made futures prices a strong predictor of share-price 
changes. Since the Great Depression, the extent to which US shares can be 
traded using borrowed money (a process that contributed to the 1929 Crash) 
has been tightly controlled, reducing the ‘leverage’ available to those trading 
shares. In contrast, the ‘margin’ deposits required in futures markets have 
historically been much lower, so a futures contract economically equivalent to a 
large block of shares can be traded with much higher leverage than could be 
employed in trading the block directly. This economic relationship is specific to 
the ‘congealed struggle’ just described. For example, the relationship between 
Treasury bond futures and the underlying bonds is more two-way, because 
high-leverage trading of Treasury bonds is possible using the collateralized 
borrowing arrangements known as ‘repo’ (interviewee AC; Brandt, Kavajecz, 
and Underwood 2007). The relationship between currency futures and 
currencies is, if anything, the reverse of that in shares, because big banks can 
trade currencies with no margin deposits at all, and thus in effect with infinite 
leverage. So price changes in currencies tend to lead changes in currency 
futures, reported interviewee AV.  
 
 Fourth, the facts that changes in the order books for US stock-index 
futures have tended to lead changes in the markets for the underlying shares 
(and that futures data can be transmitted from Chicago to New York and New 
Jersey fast enough to make profitable trading possible) have been an important 
contributor to a change in the very nature of share trading. Over the past thirty 
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years, new share-trading actors (in the actor-network-theory sense) have come 
into being, involving different configurations of human beings and non-human 
artefacts: high-frequency trading algorithms. To be profitable, the latter need to 
be able to predict price changes, not on the basis of subtle, human phenomena 
such as a fleeting look of fear on a fellow trader’s face or a change in the ‘feel’ 
of a trading floor, but using relationships of a quite different sort: relationships 
that can be programmed not just into a computer system but in many cases into 
one that is simple enough to be very fast.7 The relationship between futures 
and the underlying stocks is by no means the only such relationship (others are 
described in MacKenzie forthcoming), but historically it was the most important 
resource for price prediction. It was central, for example, to the algorithms of 
Automated Trading Desk (set up in Charleston, SC, in 1988 and in a sense the 
first ever HFT firm: see MacKenzie forthcoming) and to those of the futures 
trading firms that in the 2000s established dominant positions in share trading. 
 
 The rise of these new algorithmic actors – now to be found not just in the 
futures markets and stock markets, but also in the trading of Treasury bonds, 
options and foreign exchange, and in Europe, East Asia, and Brazil, not just in 
the US – has changed many financial markets utterly. In stock markets, for 
example, a ‘topological’ shift is underway, already largely complete in the US, 
less so in other countries. The shift is from trading as an activity conducted 
‘inside’ exchanges, to exchanges and other trading venues being ‘nested’ within 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  A	  story	  roughly	  equivalent	  to	  that	  of	  communications	  technology	  could	  be	  told	  for	  the	  
computer	  technology	  employed	  in	  HFT,	  where	  there	  is	  an	  increasingly	  tendency	  to	  minimize	  
the	  use	  of	  the	  main	  memory	  and	  central	  processor	  unit	  of	  general-­‐purpose	  computer	  systems	  
and	  to	  use	  simpler	  but	  faster	  hardware,	  especially	  FPGAs	  (field-­‐programmable	  gate	  arrays):	  
see	  MacKenzie	  (2014).	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trading, in the sense that those venues now have to compete fiercely for market 
share, and to do that they have to provide the technical features that facilitate 
the operations of algorithmic actors (MacKenzie and Pardo-Guerra 2014).  
 
 This topological shift is an example of why a material sociology of 
markets – including a material sociology of ultrafast trading – is needed. 
Epochal changes are taking place in finance, and to understand them we have 
to examine markets as embodied, physical, and technological phenomena, not 
simply as ‘social’ or ‘economic’ phenomena (if those terms are understood in 
abstraction from the technological). The story of capital’s geodesic is thus 
emblematic of wider shifts in finance that urgently require analysis, especially 
from the viewpoint of the sociology of speed. 
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High-frequency traders (AA-BV)      48 
Exchange and trading-venue members     51 
 and staff (EA-FY) 
Dealers, brokers, and broker-dealers (DA-DR)    18 
Institutional-investment firms’ traders (IA-ID)      4 
Practitioners of other forms of algorithmic trading (OA-OM)  13 
Manual traders (MA-MG)            7 
Suppliers of technology and telecommunications links to HFT 
 (SA-SO)         15 
Researchers/market analysts (RA-RP)     16
                                                                                              _____ 
Total                        172 
 
TABLE 1 The overall set of interviewees.  
 
Interviewees are identified by two-letter acronyms (specific to each 
category) in chronological order by the date of the (first) interview with 
them. E.g., AA is the first high-frequency trader interviewed (in April 
2011); BV is the most recent (in June 2015).  
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Prior to Spread Networks                c. 8 ms  
Spread Networks (August 2010)            6.65 ms 
Limit in glass fibre (refractive index 1.47)         5.78 ms 
Best current microwave (2015)      c. 4.2 ms 
Relativistic limit           3.93 ms 
 
TABLE 2 State-of-art one-way transmission times, Aurora, IL to Carteret, 
NJ (the location of Nasdaq’s data centre) in milliseconds (thousandths of 
a second). The relativistic limit is the time that would be taken by 
transmission along the geodesic if it took place at the speed of light in a 
vacuum. 
 
Sources: Laughlin et al. (2012) and miscellaneous.  
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FIGURE 1 The six main financial data centres in the US. ‘CME’ is the data 
centre of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in Aurora, IL. The four data centres 
in New Jersey are where shares (and in the case of NY4, in Secaucus, NJ, 
bonds, foreign exchange, and options as well) are traded. 
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FIGURE 2 Fibre-optic cable being laid by a construction crew working for 
Skanova, a subsidiary of TeliaSonera. Courtesy TeliaSonera. 
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FIGURE 3 A microwave tower used by McKay Brothers. Courtesy McKay 
Brothers. 
 
 
 
 
 
